New Ed Snowden NSA Leaks Target Knowledge Database” (TKB) Marina, Nymrod, & List of SIGAD Designations Surveillance 3/29/2014

USNEWSGHOST SNA Social Network Analysts, Modern intelligence Can Identify Key Individuals of Groups, NSA USNEWSGHOST

Updated 4/2 The SSO report citing FISA authorization to monitor Germany

New Ed Snowden Leaks Target Knowledge Database” (TKB) Marina, Nymrod, List of SIGAD designations Surveillance 3/29/2014

“Target Knowledge Database” (TKB)

The list begins with “A,” as in Abdullah Badawi, the former Malaysian prime minister, and continues with the presidents of Peru, Somalia, Guatemala and Colombia right up to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. The final name on the list, No. 122, is Yulia Tymoshenko, who was Ukrainian prime minister at the time. The NSA listed the international leaders alphabetically by their first name, with Tymoshenko listed under “Y”. Merkel is listed under “A” as the ninth leader, right behind Malawian President Amadou Toumani Touré, but before Syrian dictator Bashar Assad.

“Complete Profiles”

The document indicates that Angela Merkel has been placed in the so-called “Target Knowledge Database” (TKB), the central database of individual targets. An internal NSA description states that employees can use it to analyze “complete profiles” of target persons. The responsible NSA unit praises the automated machine-driven administration of collected information about high-value targets.

The searchable sources cited in the document include, among others, the signals intelligence database “Marina,” which contains metadata ingested from sources around the world. The unit also gives special attention to promoting a system for automated name recognition called “Nymrod“. The document states that some 300 automatically generated “cites,” or citations, are provided for Angela Merkel alone. The citations in “Nymrod” are derived from intelligence agencies, transcripts of intercepted fax, voice and computer-to-computer communication. According to internal NSA documents, it is used to “find information relating to targets that would otherwise be tough to track down.” Each of the names contained in Nymrod is considered a “SIGINT target.”

The manual maintenance of the database with high-ranking targets is a slow and painstaking process, the document notes, and fewer than 200,000 targets are managed through the system. Automated capture, by contrast, simplifies the saving of the data and makes it possible to manage more than 3 million entries, including names and the citations connected to them.

The table included in the document indicates the capture and maintenance of records pertaining to Merkel already appears to have been automated. In any case, the document indicates that a manual update was not available in May 2009. The document could be another piece of the puzzle for investigators in Karlsruhe because it shows that Chancellor Merkel was an official target for spying.

In addition to surveillance of the chancellor, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is also exploring the question of whether the NSA conducted mass espionage against the German people. The internal NSA material also includes a weekly report dating from March 2013 from the Special Sources Operations (SSO) division, the unit responsible for securing NSA access to major Internet backbone structures, like fiber optic cables.

In the document, the team that handles contact with US telecommunications providers like AT&T or Verizon reports on the legal foundations with which it monitors the data of certain countries. According to the SSO report, FISA, the special court responsible for intelligence agency requests, provided the NSA with authorization to monitor “Germany” on March 7, 2013. The case number provided in the ruling is 13-319.

However, only 12 names were revealed by the German journalists in the publication as an example.

With the heads of state arranged alphabetically by first name, the list begins with ‘A’ as in Abdullah Badawi, the former Malaysian prime minister.

He’s followed by Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, who appears so high due to being mentioned under his alias, Abu Mazin.

The catalogue of world leaders under surveillance goes on with the heads of Peru, Somalia, Guatemala and Colombia right up to Aleksander Lukashenko of Belarus.

The list is completed by Yulia Tymoshenko at No.122, who used to be Ukrainian prime minister from February-September 2005 and from December 2007 till March 2010.

Merkel appears on the document between former Mali president, Amadou Toumani Toure, and Syrian leader, Bashar Assad.

Dragnet Spying

The documents do not provide sufficient information to precisely determine the types of data included in the order, and the NSA has said it will not comment on the matter. However, lawyers at the American Civil Liberties Union believe it provides the NSA with permission to access the communications of all German citizens, regardless whether those affected are suspected of having committed an offense or not. Under the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA is permitted to conduct blanket surveillance in foreign countries without any requirement to submit individual cases for review by the court, whose deliberations and rulings are top-secret.

According to the partial list in the document, the court has provided similar authorization for countries including, China, Mexico, Japan, Venezuela, Yemen, Brazil, Sudan, Guatemala, Bosnia and Russia. In practice, the NSA uses this permission in diverse ways — sometimes it uses it to monitor telecommunications companies, and at others it surveils individuals.

“So far, we have no knowledge that Internet nodes in Germany have been spied on by the NSA,” Hans-Georg Maassen, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, which is also responsible for counterintelligence measures, said last summer.

It’s also possible the Americans don’t even have to do that, at least not directly. It’s quite feasible they have better access through major US providers like AT&T or Verizon whose infrastructure is used to process a major share of global Internet traffic. The NSA could use that infrastructure to access data from Germany. This would be legal at least according to the FISA court.

The headquarters of Stellar, a company based in the town of Hürth near Cologne, are visible from a distance. Seventy-five white antennas dominate the landscape. The biggest are 16 meters (52 feet) tall and kept in place by steel anchors. It is an impressive sight and serves as a popular backdrop for scenes in TV shows, including the German action series “Cobra 11.”

Stellar operates a satellite ground station in Hürth, a so-called “teleport.” Its services are used by companies and institutions; Stellar’s customers include Internet providers, telecommunications companies and even a few governments. “The world is our market,” is the high-tech company’s slogan.

Using their ground stations and leased capacities from satellites, firms like Stellar — or competitors like Cetel in the nearby village of Ruppichteroth or IABG, which is headquartered in Ottobrunn near Munich — can provide Internet and telephone services in even the most remote areas. They provide communications links to places like oil drilling platforms, diamond mines, refugee camps and foreign outposts of multinational corporations and international organizations.

Super high-speed Internet connections are required at the ground stations in Germany in order to ensure the highest levels of service possible. Most are connected to major European Internet backbones that offer particularly high bandwidth.

Probing German Internet Traffic

The service they offer isn’t just attractive to customers who want to improve their connectivity. It is also of interest to Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service, which has targeted the German companies. Top secret documents from the archive of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden viewed by SPIEGEL show that the British spies surveilled employees of several German companies, and have also infiltrated their networks.

One top-secret GCHQ paper claims the agency sought “development of in-depth knowledge of key satellite IP service providers in Germany.”

The document, which is undated, states that the goal of the effort was developing wider knowledge of Internet traffic flowing through Germany. The 26-page document explicitly names three of the German companies targeted for surveillance: Stellar, Cetel and IABG.

The operation, carried out at listening stations operated jointly by GCHQ with the NSA in Bude, in Britain’s Cornwall region, is largely directed at Internet exchange points used by the ground station to feed the communications of their large customers into the broadband Internet. In addition to spying on the Internet traffic passing through these nodes, the GCHQ workers state they are also seeking to identify important customers of the German teleport providers, their technology suppliers as well as future technical trends in their business sector.

The document also states that company employees are targets — particularly engineers — saying that they should be detected and “tasked,” intelligence jargon for monitoring. In the case of Stellar, the top-secret GCHQ paper includes the names and email addresses of 16 employees, including CEO Christian Steffen. In addition, it also provides a list of the most-important customers and partners. Contacted by SPIEGEL, Stellar CEO Steffen said he had not been aware of any attempts by intelligence services to infiltrate or hack his company. “I am shocked,” he said.

‘Servers of Interest’

Intelligence workers in Bude also appear to have succeeded in infiltrating competitor Cetel. The document states that workers came across four “servers of interest” and were able to create a comprehensive list of customers. According to Cetel CEO Guido Neumann, the company primarily serves customers in Africa and the Middle East and its clients include non-governmental organizations as well as a northern European country that uses Cetel to connect its diplomatic outposts to the Internet. Neumann also says he was surprised when he learned his firm had been a target.

The firm IABG in Ottobrunn appears to have been of particular interest to the intelligence service — at least going by a short notation that only appears next to the Bavarian company’s name. It notes, “this may have already been looked at by NSA NAC,” a reference to the NSA’s network analysis center.

IABG’s history goes back to the 1970s. The company was established as a test laboratory for aerospace and space technologies. The German Defense Ministry was an important client as well. Although the company has been privately held since 1993, it has continued to play a role in a number of major projects connected at least in part to the government. For example, it operated the testing facility for Germany’s Transrapid super high-speed maglev train and also conducted testing on the Airbus A380 super jumbo jet and the Ariane rocket, the satellite launcher at the heart of the European space program.

IABG also does considerable business with the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces. The company states that its “defense and security” unit is “committed to the armed forces and their procurement projects.” These include solutions for “security issues, for prevention and reactions against dangers like terrorism and attacks against critical infrastructure.”

Like Stellar and Cetel, the company also operates a satellite ground station — one that apparently got hacked, according to the GCHQ document. It includes a list of IABG routers and includes their network addresses. In addition, it contains the email addresses of 16 employees at the company named as possible targets. IABG did not respond to a request for comment from SPIEGEL. In a statement, GCHQ said it does not comment on intelligence-related issues but “all of GCHQ’s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate.”


Monitoring companies and their employees along with the theft of customer lists are classic acts of economic espionage. Indeed, such revelations ought be a case for the German federal public prosecutors’ office, which in the past has initiated investigations into comparable cases involving Russia or China.

So far, however, German Federal Public Prosecutor Harald Range has been struggling with the NSA issue. Some experienced investigators have had a problem applying the same criteria used to assess intelligence services like Russia’s to those of the United States and Britain. Federal prosecutors in Karlsruhe have provided a preliminary assessment, but so far no decision has been made about whether the agency will move forward with legal proceedings.

Under review at the moment are allegations that the NSA monitored the chancellor’s mobile phone and also conducted mass surveillance on the communications of millions of Germans.

The launch of legal proceedings against GCHQ agents or NSA employees would quickly become a major political issue that would further burden already tense trans-Atlantic relations. An additional problem is the fact that Range is in possession of very few original documents, particularly those pertaining to the NSA’s monitoring of Chancellor Merkel.

The secret NSA document dealing with high-ranking targets has provided further indications that Merkel was a target. The document is a presentation from the NSA’s Center for Content Extraction, whose multiple tasks include the automated analysis of all types of text data. The lists appear to contain 122 country leaders. Twelve names are listed as an example, including Merkel’s.

List of SIGAD Designations Updated

After providing lists of NSA-related codenames, abbreviations and SIGADs, list of the designations of the numerous divisions and units of the NSA organization itself.

Unlike other intelligence agencies such as CIA or DIA, NSA never disclosed its internal organizational structure. The following overview has been reconstructed based upon information which over the years became available from various sources, including the recent Snowden-leaks.

In 2013, the following numbers of people worked for NSA/CSS:
– NSA: ca. 21,500 civilian personnel and ca. 13,500 military personnel
– CSS (tactical SIGINT collection units): ca. 12,000 military personnel

This list only gives the alphanumeric designations, the official name and, if available, the logo of NSA branches. For a description of what the most important divisions do, click the links in the list or visit the websites mentioned under Links and Sources.

D: Office of the Director

D0: Director’s Staff

D01: Director’s Operation Group (DOG)
D05: Director’s Secretariat
D07: Office of Protocol
D08: Homeland Security Support Office (HSSO)

D1: Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
D2: Office of the General Counsel (OGC)

D21: ?

D24: ?

D5: Corporate Assessments Office

D5T: Technology Test and Evaluation

D6: Office of Equal Employment Oppertunity

D7: Central Security Service (CSS)

D709: CSS Staff and Resources
D7D: Cryptologic Doctrine Office
D7P: Office of Military Personnel
D7R: Director’s Reserve Forces Advisor

D8: Community ELINT Management Office (CEMO)

DA: Directorate of Acquisition/Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE)

DB: Corporate Strategy

DC: Director’s Chief of Staff

DC0: Support
DC3: Policy

DC31: Corporate Policy
DC32: Information Policy

DC321: Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act (FOIA/PA)
DC322: Information Security and Records Management

DC3221: Information Security Policy
DC3223: Records Management Policy

DC323: Automated Declassification Services

DC33: Technology Security, Export, and Encryption Policy

DC4: Corporate Strategic Planning and Performance
DC6: External Relations & Communications
DC8: Corporate Management Services

DE: Unified Cryptologic Architecture Office (OCAO)
DF: Chief Financial Manager (CFM)
DK: Chief Information Officer (CIO)
DL: Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)
DP: Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD)
DT: Office of the Chief Technical Officer (CTO)

E: Associate Directorate for Education and Training (ADET)

El: Educational Services and Staff
E2: Educational Technology Integration
E3: Language
E4: Intelligence Analysis and Information Assurance
E5: Signals Analysis, Cryptanalysis, and Math
EL: Center for Leadership and Professional Development

F: Field sites

F1: Cryptologic Services Groups

F1C: ?

F1CA: Cryptologic Services Group USSTRATCOM
F1CD: Life Cycle Logistics

F1CD1: Technical Services Group

F1I: ?

F1I2: Joint Interagency Task Force South

F1T: ?

F1T1: Cryptologic Services Group USSOCOM

F1Z: Cryptologic Services Group CENTCOM

F1Z2: Deputy Chief, CSG CENTCOM

F2: NSA/CSS Europe and Africa

F20: ?

F204: Support to Military Operations for AFRICOM

F22: European Cryptologic Center (ECC)
F23: NCER Mons, Belgium

F3: ?

F4: ?

F411: Military Operations Branch

F5: ?

F6: Special Collection Service (SCS)

F666E: (SCS unit in the US embassy in Berlin?)
F7: ?

F74: Meade Operations Center (MOC)

F741: Deployments & Training Division
F74?: Special Operations Readiness Cell (SORC)

F77: ?

F77F: Menwith Hill

F79: ?

F79F: Misawa Security Operations Center (MSOC)

F91: ?

FC: NSA/CSS Colorado (NSAC)

FG: NSA/CSS Georgia (NSAG)

FGD: Director, Georgia
FGS: SID, Georgia

FGS3: Transnational issues group
FG32: ?

FG3223 – Media Exploitation & Analysis


FHS: Signals Intelligence Department, Hawaii


FTS: Signals Intelligence Department, Texas

FTS2: Analysis and Production

FTS2F1 – “Southern Arc”

FTS3: Data Acquisition

FTS32: Tailored Access Operations

FTS327: Requirements & targeting

I0: Chief of Staff

I01: Office of Policy
I2: Trusted Engineering Solutions

I209: Support Staff

I21: Architecture
I22: Engineering
I23: ?

I231: HAIPE Program Management Office (PMO)

I2N: National Nuclear Command Capabilities (N2C2) Mission

I3: Operations

I31: Current Operations
I33: Remote & Deployed Operations
I3?: Mission Integration Office
I3?: Technical Security Evaluations
I3?: Red Cell
I3?: Blue Cell
I3?: Advanced Adversary Network Penetration Cell
I3?: Joint Communications Security Monitoring

I4: Fusion, Analysis and Mitigation
IE: Engagement
IS: Strategy
IC: Cyber Integration
IV: Oversight and Compliance

K: National Security Operations Center (NSOC)

K?: […] (SMM)

K??: […] Mission Management (APSMM)
K??: […] Mission Management (CRSMM)
K?: Counter-Terrorism Mission Management Center? (CTMMC)

K9: Capabilities and Sustaining Systems (CASS)

K92: Current Capabilities for Mission Management (C2M2)

L0: I&L Staff
LF: Facilities Services

LFl: Space Management and Facilities Planning
LF2: ?
LF3: Operations, Maintenance and Utilities
LF4: ?
LF5: Program Management

LL: Logistics Services

LL1: Material Management
LL2: Transportation, Asset, and Disposition Services
LL3: Employee Morale Services

M: Associate Directorate for Human Resource Services (ADHRS)

MA: Office of Workforce Strategies
MB: Office of Recruitment and Staffing
MC: Office of Diversity Management (ODM)
MD: Office of Human Resource Program Management & Service
ME: Office of Occupational Health, Environmental & Safety Services (OHESS)
MG: Office of Global Human Resource Services
M2: Office of Military Personnel
M3: Office of Civilian Personnel
M4: ?

M43: Information Policy Division

MJ: ?

MJ1: HR operations/global personnel SA

Q: Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence

Q0: Staff

Q05: Security Operations Center (SOC)
Q07: NSA Counterintelligence Center (NSACC)
Q09: Security Support Staff

Q1: Office of Physical Security

Q123: ?

Q2: Office of Personnel Security

Q223: Counterintelligence Awareness

Q5: Office of Security

Q509: Security Policy Staff

Q51: Physical Security Division
Q52: Field Security Division
Q56: Security Awareness
Q57: Polygraph

Q7: Counterintelligence

QJ: Joint Program Security Office

R: Research Associate Directorate (RD)

R1: Math & Research
R2: Trusted Systems Research
R3: Laboratory for Physical Sciences (LPS)
R4: Laboratory for Telecom Services (LTS)
R5: Language Study
R6: Computer Information and Science
RX: Special Access Research
RV: Oversight and Compliance


S0: SID Staff

S01: Deputy for Integrated Planning

S012: ?

S0121: SID Communications

S02: Communications and Support Operations

S02L: ?

S02L1: SIGINT Policy


S11: Customer Gateway

S111: (Desk for coordinating RFIs and responses)

S12: Information Sharing Services Branch

S12?: Partnership Dissemination Cell (PDC)
S124: Staff Services Division

S17: Strategic Intelligence Issues
S1E: Electromagnetic Space Program Management Office
S1P: Plans & Exercises Division



S20: A&P Staff

S203A: Access Interface Portfolio

S2A: South Asia Product Line

S2A4: Pakistan
S2A5: (South-Asia)

S2A51: S-A Language Analysis Branch
S2A52: S-A Reporting Branch

S2B: China, Korea, Taiwan Product Line
S2C: International Security Issues (ISI) Product Line

S2C32: European States Branch

S2C41: Mexico Leadership Team
S2C42: Brazilian Leadership Team

S2D: Counter Foreign Intelligence Product Line
S2E: Middle East and Africa Product Line
S2F: International Crime and Narcotics Product Line

S2F1: (“Southern Arc”?)

S2G: Counter Proliferation (CP) Product Line
S2H: Russia Product Line
S2I: Counter-Terrorism (CT) Product Line

S2I3: ?

S2I35: ? (related to RC-135U?)

S2I4: Homeland Mission Center (HMC)

S2I42: Hezbollah Team
S2I43: NOM Team

S2I5: Advanced Analysis Division (AAD)
S2I?: Metadata Analysis Center (MAC)
S2IX: Special CT Operations

S2J: Weapons and Space Product Line
S2T: Current Threats


S31: Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES)

S310: ?

S31091: Military Operations Branch

S311: Office of Target Pursuit

S31131: Exploitation branche
S31133: Exploitation branche
S31142: Exploitation branche
S31143: Exploitation branche
S31174: ?
S31??: Technical Exploitation Center (TEC)

S3132: Protocol Exploitation and Dissemination

S316: Target Reconaissance and Survey

S3161: Special Deployments Division

S32: Tailored Access Operations (TAO)

S321: Remote Operations Center (ROC)

S321?: Network Ops Center (NOC)
S321?: Oper. Readiness Division (ORD)
S321?: Interactive Ops Division (IOD)
S321?: Production Ops Division (POD)
S321?: Access Ops Division (AOD)

S322: Advanced Network Technology (ANT)

S3221: (persistence software)
S3222: (software implants)

S32221: ?
S32222: (routers, servers, etc.)

S3223: (hardware implants)
S3224: ?

S32241: ?
S32242: (GSM cell)
S32243: (radar retro-refl.)

S323: Data Network Technologies (DNT)
S324: Telecomm. Network Technologies (TNT)
S325: Mission Infrastructure Technologies (MIT)
S327: Requirements & Targeting (R&T)
S326: ?
S328: Access Technologies Operations (ATO)
S32P: TAO Program Planning Integration
S32?: Network Warfare Team (NWT)
S32X: ?

S33: Global Access Operations (GAO)


S332: Terrestrial SIGINT

S33221: ?
S33223: Processing Systems Engineering and Integration Sector

S333: Overhead SIGINT

S333?: Overhead Collection Management Center (OCMC)

S33P: Portfolio Management Office (PMO)

S33P1: ?
S33P2: Technology Integration Division
S33P3: Tactical SIGINT Technology Office

S33?: CROSSHAIR Network Management Center (CNMC)

S34: Target Strategies and Mission Integration (TSMI)

S342: Collection Coordination and Strategies

S3421: ?
S3422: Geographical Regions
S3423: Technical Services

S343: Targeting and Mission Management
S344: Partnership and Enterprise Management

S35: Special Source Operations (SSO)

S351: ?

S352: ?

S3520: Office of Target Reconaissance and Survey (OTRS)
S3521: Special Signal Collection unit (MUSKETEER)

S353: ?

S3533: ?

S35333: PRISM Collection Management

S35?: Operations and Discovery Division

S35??: Environmental Analysis Branch

S35P: Portfolio Management Office

S35P2: Technical Integration Division
S35P3: Capabilities Integration Division

SSG: SIGDEV Strategy and Governance

Network Analysis Center
SE: SIGINT & Electronic Warfare

SV: Oversight and Compliance

SV4: Special FISA Oversight and Processing


TE: Enterprise Systems
TS: Information and Systems Security
TT: Independent Test and Evaluation
T1: Mission Capabilities

T1?: Strategic SATCOM Security Engineering Office
T1221: Center for Content Extraction (CCE)
T1222: Enrichment Center


T2: Business Capabilities
T3: Enterprise IT Services

T32: ?

T3212: Workflow, Standards and Support

T3221: Transport Field Services (TFS)

T332: Global Enterprise Command Center (GECC)

T332?: Data and Network Operations
T332?: NSA Communications Center
T332?: NISIRT (contains CERT and CSIRT)

T334: National Signals Processing Center (NSPC)
T335: Deployable Communications Operations (DCO)
T33?: National Intelligence and Tactical Operations (NITO)

T5: High Performance Computing Center
T6: Ground Systems Program Office

V: NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC)

V07: ?

V2: Office of Analysis

V222: ?
V225: ?
V252: ?

V3: NTOC Operations

V32: Defensive Network Operations
V33: ?
V34: Next Generation Wireless Exploitation Program

X: ?

X3: ?

X31: ?

X312: Planning & Management

X32: ?

? NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC)

In the year 2000, then director Michael Hayden reorganized much of NSA’s organizational structure. New officers were appointed, like a Chief Financial manager, a Chief Information Officer (CIO), a Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE) and a Transformation Officer. Around the same time, many NSA divisions and units got new designations.

Also in 2000, a Senior Leadership team was formed, consisting of the Director (DIRNSA), the Deputy Director and the Directors of the Signals Intelligence (SID), the Information Assurance (IAD) and the Technology Directorate (TD). The chiefs of other main NSA divisions became Associate Directors of the Senior Leadership team.

Links Sources
– NSA Salaries 2014
– Marc Ambinder’s The NSA’s org chart
– The NSA’s org chart
– Updated NSA Order of Battle
– William M. Arkin Online: NSA Tailored Access Operations
– Inside the NSA: Peeling back the curtain on America’s intelligence agency
– An Educated Guess About How the NSA Is Structured
– Extract of pages from the NSA’s intranet, 2005 (pdf)
– NSA Overhauls Corporate Structure in Effort to Improve Operations (2000)


New Edward J. Snowden Leaks 3/20/14 – 3/23/14

BOUNDLESS INFORMANT, Project Bullrun, PRISM, Snowden TED Speech

Snowden Leaks MYSTIC NSA Surveillance System

Edward Snowden details contain TURBINE, other surveillance technology

JTRIG Leaks Part 1

How To Stop NSA Spying

Sources: , ,


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